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Abstract
This paper develops a means of visualizing the vulnerability of complex sys-
tems of financial interactions around the globe using Neural Network clustering
techniques. We show how time-varying spillover indices can be translated into two
dimensional crisis maps. The crisis maps have the advantage of showing the chang-
ing paths of vulnerability, including the direction and extent of the effect between
source and affected markets. Using equity market data for 31 global markets over
1998-2017 we provide these crisis maps. These tools help portfolio managers and
policy makers to distinguish which of the available tools for crisis management will
be most appropriate for the form of vulnerability in play.
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Introduction
Observed changes in correlation between asset returns during periods of stress have been
variously attributed to contagion, spillovers and/or heightened vulnerability of networks.
While the literature stretches back as early as King et al. (1994) on spillovers and Allen
and Gale (1998) on contagion, the empirical work on networks and systemic risk/ con-
nection is more recent 1. One of the most important predictions of the network literature
demonstrates how financial sector networks can become ‘vulnerable’. Shocks may spread
dramatically via financial interconnectedness as ‘vulnerability’ affects otherwise ‘robust’
networks. Empirical representations show how the networks themselves change over time,
between calm and crisis periods, and with the development and growth of emerging cap-
ital markets; see for example Billio et al. (2012), Khandani et al. (2013), Demirer et al.
(2018a) and Chowdhury (2018). The changing nature of the links between institutions
can itself be cast as a measure of contagion; see, Dungey et al. (2017), while spillover in-
dices can be obtained from network adjacency matrices proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009).2
This paper presents visualization of crisis transmission pathway in a system of finan-
cial network via recursive neural networks, largely known as Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN). By considering the largest vulnerabilities in the ANN patterns we produce crisis
maps which highlight the least resistance shock transmission pathways at any point in
time. They are somewhat analogous to slices of a brain scan lit up by firing neural path-
ways and as such are easily processed visually. We show how ANN methods relate to the
commonly understood VAR representation and hence can be cast as an extension of the
vulnerability representations with networks as in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014); Diebold and
Yilmaz (2015). The Self Organizing Maps used for this purpose dictates other methods in
this area of studies, in that, the maps are produced with a recursive algorithm initiated
with random vectors, executing relentlessly until repeating patterns are identified and
classified. Self organizing maps are popularized as ‘deep unsupervised learning’.
We estimate transmissions from systemic risk estimates, which provides an easily acces-
sible image of the pathways which are most likely to transmit crisis shocks across the
system at point in time. This is used to draw two-dimensional maps of how these path-
1Systemic risk is the risk inherent in a system of closely connected entities, that can be cast as measure
of crisis in the system. That is if triggered, can result in cascading down of the entities forming a global
crisis situation. The structure implicit to systemic risk contains the degree of risks transmitted to others
from one element and the degree of risks received by the element from others. This allows identification
of nodes as either high spreaders or strong receivers within a closed system. The property of receiving
shocks from others is closely related to the concept of the varying ‘vulnerability’ (Allen and Gale, 2000;
Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2015).
2See applications and extensions in Yilmaz et al. (2018); Demirer et al. (2018b,c); Yilmaz (2017);
Diebold et al. (2017); Diebold and Yilmaz (2015); Diebold and Yılmaz (2014).
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ways change as a crisis, and its associated management plan progresses. Further, we
contribute in the vein of early warning literature by presenting in-sample predictions of
crisis building in our predefined system.
Our aim is to convincingly implement means by which managers of systemic risk can also
simulate the effect of alternative intervention paths in a network and have some knowl-
edge of where the most effective interventions may lie given the structure of the network
at any point in time. Although we use existing data, managers may decide to randomize
inputs, altering expectations or simply feed the networks with predictions to detect alter-
native transmission pathways. Thus, we specifically acknowledge the conditional nature
of the problem, and that intervention strategies may need to be flexible and time-varying,
responding to the changing structure of the network and the many alternative possible
sources of shocks.
The literature making use of ANN in systemic risk pattern recognition taking advantage
of Self Organizing Maps (SOM) is new. Similar application is found only in Sarlin and
Peltonen (2013). The approach allows monitoring of channels of crisis transmission,
visualizing of vulnerability patterns in a closed system, and proposes an early warning
system for possible crisis transmission effects. Betz et al. (2014) shows that SOM has
superior prediction properties than traditional latent models based on early learning
systems in predicting crises.
We adapt the SOM approach to include estimated unconditional spillover measures into
the crisis map - the original Sarlin and Peltonen (2013) maps are calibrated, rather than
drawn from estimated relationships. The crisis maps indicate the propagation of a crisis
from one position in a space to adjacent locations of the financial stability neighborhood,
allowing us to map instabilities throughout connected global markets. More generally, the
use of crisis maps allow us to connect the ANN approach to existing concepts of financial
stability. Earlier papers using ANN for crisis prediction include Liu and Lindholm (2006);
Peltonen (2006); Apolloni et al. (2009); Marghescu et al. (2010); Betz et al. (2014), and for
network mapping see Barthélemy (2011); Sarlin and Peltonen (2013); and very recently
for the clustering of capital markets with SOM, see Resta (2016). Finally, this system
enhances our capacity to recognize the direction of induced vulnerability if a crisis ensues.
The maps represent a new frontier in the usage of systemic risk and dynamic network
estimates.
This paper uses a balanced sample of 31 equity indices3. We classify the markets into five
clusters based on commonality in their economic indicators or common experiences with
crisis. These are identified as Export Crisis (EC) markets - including markets which are
3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri-Lanka, Thailand, The Philippines, the USA, United Kingdom.
3
heavily export oriented (oil and non-oil); oil exporters in terms of both emerging (OEE)
and developed (OED) markets; European markets directly affected by the Greek crisis of
2010 on-wards (GC), high-yield Asia-Pacific countries directly affected by the Asian crisis
of 1997-98 (AC). By inclusion of the USA and Japan identified as conduit countries in
global literature (BIS, 1998; Baur and Schulze, 2005), we aim to identify conduit effects
in the system. The grouping of countries into each of these categories is shown in Table 1.
Together with these indices our network incorporates the West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
Oil Price Index for the inclusion of oil market conditions.4
The sample period covers 1998 to 2017, capturing multiple episodes of financial stress,
including the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, the 1998 Russian Financial and LTCM
crises, 2000 Dot-com bubble, 2000 Global Energy Crisis, the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the SARS outbreak and third global oil crisis in 2003,
the ongoing Gaza conflict, the unrest in 2006 through both North Korean missile tests and
the eruption of war between Israel and Lebanon also in 2006, the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis and subsequent European Sovereign debt crisis; as well as the 2014 Russian crisis
and the 2016 Export crisis. Table 1 provides a brief description of each of these events
along with the broad dating conventions. Our results also allow us to focus on the
potential emerging risk of a crisis centering on China as an important conduit market
as proposed in Elliott (2017); Mullen (2017); Quijones (2017); Mauldin (2017); Friedman
(2016); Jolly and Bradsher (2015).
We identify the most crisis-prone markets and explain how the impact of innovations
in those markets differ from those in markets which are less crisis-prone. The inclusion
of oil exporting markets, during periods where conflict affected oil supplies allows us to
examine the sensitivity of the global system to volatility and shocks from these sources.
We address six important questions concerning the time varying nature of systemic risk
estimates leading to the detection of crisis transmission patterns. First, we examine
whether policy interventions which restrict significant transmission paths help intercon-
nected markets weather shocks. Second, we find that the changing interactions between
markets results in changing patterns in risk transmission. Third, we examine whether it
is possible to detect which markets are more shock resistant in the sample period from
1998-2017. Fourth, we cut individual pairwise links off from the structural parameter
estimates and identify if this reduces vulnerability/resilience. Fifth, we produce time
varying crisis transmission pathway maps for a predefined system. We illustrate the
changing dynamics in risk transmission, and show how this visualization helps to high-
light the contemporaneous contagion and spillover effects using self organizing crisis-maps
. Finally, we examine if a completing feedback loop among a cluster spill risks out of the
cluster to other clusters Davis et al. (2010), and hence if prediction of such in the patterns
4We use S&P GSCI Commodity Return Index for commodity inclusion when applicable.
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warns us of ensuing crisis into the system.
We find evidence for both increased resilience in the financial networks corresponding
to policy interventions in response to a crisis, and previously resilient markets becoming
susceptible to newer shocks. This is particularly clear since the European debt crisis. We
also find strong evidence of changing interconnections between markets.
We identify the more resilient markets using dynamic networks and crisis-maps. Finally,
we show that while spillover indices strongly indicate the possibility of crisis generation
at the end of the sample period, the crisis maps do not indicate forming a feedback loop
and does not result in contagion. This demonstrates the usefulness of the crisis maps in
complementing the evidence available from spillover indices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a brief review of literature. Section II
presents the empirical framework and Section III the data set. The results are presented
in Section IV, beginning with the system wide connectedness and the associated network
among the markets. This sets the stage for subsequent dynamic analysis. We proceed to
develop the crisis-map implementation with SOM. Section VI concludes the paper with
some remarks concerning the role of this new tool in investment and policy decisions.
Literature Review
Evidence of transmission between markets during crises and the changing size and direc-
tion of spillovers poses challenges for diversification and regulatory policy. A substantial
literature addresses contagion and volatility spillovers as a mechanism of transmission,
particularly in assessing changes in the contemporaneous interdependence among vari-
ables (Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).5 A variety of identification
approaches to separate contagion, interdependence and volatility spillovers exist (Diebold
and Yilmaz, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Bekaert et al., 2013;
Chambet and Gibson, 2008; Eiling and Gerard, 2011; Brooks and Del Negro, 2005; Puk-
thuanthong and Roll, 2009).
Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2016) define interconnectedness as a bridge between two
crucial visions, ‘pure contagion’ and ‘shock spillover’. Piccotti (2017) argues that there
exists a symbiotic relationship in contagion and systemic risk. Endogenous credit and
capital constraints turn non-systemic risks to systemic as crisis is propelled through dif-
ferent markets, followed by a reinforcing cycle. The propagation of the crisis itself brings
about temporal changes to the aggregate elasticity of temporal substitution affecting as-
set prices in different markets (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1996, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore,
5While Collins and Biekpe (2003) define contagion as reversals to net capital flow to an economy,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that the correlation between market returns is largely due to common
factors, and hence represents interdependence rather than contagion.
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1997; Longstaff and Wang, 2012; Elliott et al., 2014; Shenoy and Williams, 2017). Hence,
financial contagion increases costs, as the marginal utility of consumption is negatively
affected in the short term for long term investors.
While a plethora of studies concerns systemic risk in banking liquidity crisis only, and it
is easy to ignore the forming of systemic risk in the equity indices caused by as such in
the banking industry; there is a strand of literature connecting the banking and equity
market systemic risk transmissions. Myers (1977) describes that as banks and depository
financial institutions siphon off large collaterized debts, it drags all other common equities
build into such debt portfolios down with it for similar institutions. This leads to systemic
decline in equity indices, and as Hanson et al. (2011) conjectures, the resulting fire sales
triggered in the equity market is in effect similar to a credit crunch, turning a micro
level downturn to a macro crisis. The study of Hanson et al. (2011) cements, that in
resemblance systemic markets and systemic financial institutions are not different while
facing a global crisis. Diamond and Rajan (2011); Shleifer and Vishny (2010); Stein
(2010) further supports this phenomenon by finding intimate connections between credit
crunch and fire sale. Among others, Gorton and Metrick (2012); Covitz et al. (2009)
cannot distinguish between equity market collapse and a classic bank run on in effect.
Allen and Carletti (2006) outlines that systemic risk does not lead to a cascade if there
is proper diversification and no contagion, in both equity markets and in SIFI’s 6. The
emergence of a large shock triggers risk transfer between two institutions, two sectors or
asset categories (Allen and Carletti, 2010; Billio et al., 2012; Bonaldi et al., 2015; Dungey
et al., 2017; Farhi and Tirole, 2017) creating contagion. By definition, contagion is the
transfer of systemic risk between two entities or securities, that the conduits connect.
This leads to amplification of systemic risk between the entities. Hence, contagion is the
catalyst during a crisis that activates systemic risk transmission and vice versa. Khan-
dani and Lo (2011), supports this argument by proposing the ‘unwinding hypothesis’,
that explains systemic risk building in the equity markets with feedback loops forming
elsewhere.
Davis et al. (2010) provides empirical evidence of a feedback loop in real sector and asset
market reinforcing a secondary feedback loop in the banking sector forming an enormous
adverse feedback loop. Stein (2010) and Hanson et al. (2011) further explains this con-
nection with trenching. Most often, institutional investors rely on short term borrowings
for buying trenches of securities. Such trenches of assets are produced by entities such as
‘structured investment vehicles’ that are often affiliated with banks and depository insti-
tutions. Such holdings are used to finance overnight collaterized borrowings in the repo
market, in form of ‘repurchase agreement’, that in turn are used by banks for ‘delever-
aging’, reducing cost of raising capital, leading to the formation of a ‘shadow banking
6Systematically important financial institutions
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system’. According to Stein (2010); Hanson et al. (2011) This ‘shadow banking system’
is to blame for systemic risks in banks to contribute in developing systemic risks for equi-
ties and vice versa. More recently, Brunnermeier et al. (2016) provides evidence that, in
trenching, common equities for two banks are build into collaterized debt obligations that
are traded in repo markets. In the event of an institutional investors failure to roll over
financing, leading to essential fire sales drops the market price for the common equity and
in turn reduces the value of portfolios maintained by a different bank located in different
countries. Here, a contagion formed within the banks contribute to systemic risk building
in the equity markets across borders.
It is important to understand that connectedness parameters at large do not indicate risk
transmission, but identifies the degree of systemic connections, in our case, across borders.
Systemic risk transfer within borders may not lead to a full scale crisis, but risk transfer
across borders, as Brunnermeier et al. (2016) suggests, may indicate a diabolic loop, or
as highlighted in Farhi and Tirole (2017) a deadly doom loop creating a large scale crisis,
that contagion parameters may capture. While contagion parameters captures only the
volatility spillovers as suggested in Masson (1998); Khan and Park (2009); Bekaert et al.
(2013) that may emerge with large shocks spilling over onto the neighbors corresponding
to an event, that is not likely be a systemic event (Dungey and Renault, 2018). We aim
to identify the spillovers originating from high degree of systemic risk build up and both
the ex ante and ex post development of systemic crisis. This leans more toward financial
network studies that is made popular by Dungey et al. (2010b); Billio et al. (2012);
Khandani et al. (2013); Anufriev and Panchenko (2015); Acemoglu et al. (2015); Dungey
et al. (2017); Demirer et al. (2017) presented in the first half of the paper. The discussion
leads to visualization of risk topography approaches of such indicated in (Duffie, 2013) 7
but with a much bigger system. This further contributes to the novelty of the paper.
Extant empirical work explores the buildup of systemic risk in growing markets which
experience pro-cyclical credit buffers and financial crises of varying sizes (Dungey et al.,
2013, 2007; Antonakakis and Vergos, 2013; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). The changes in
networks between markets following a crisis period may result in higher shock spillover
than previously observed (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Dungey et al., 2005, 2007), some of
which may be a consequence of bubbles fueled by credit expansion and associated build-
up of macroeconomic vulnerabilities (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Alessi and Detken,
2009; Drehmann et al., 2010; Drehmann and Juselius, 2014). The recessions resulting
from the burst of bubbles are shown to be relatively deep and protracted, and feature a
slow recovery (Jordà et al., 2013; Hermansen and Röhn, 2017).
Cyclical swings in credit conditions lead to varying degrees of crises stemming from sys-
7 Duffie (2013) proposes a 10 by 10 by 10 approach, whereas we progress with a 31 by 30 by 30
approach
7
temic risks in the interconnected capital markets (Gonzalez et al., 2017). In turn this
has led to concerns over means for reducing the pro-cyclicality of prudential and capital
market regulation (BIS, 2010a,b)8. These concerns have led to a heightened interest in
how monitoring capital market interconnectedness may help in early detection of buildup
in systemic cyclical risks (Hermansen and Röhn, 2017; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998;
Alessi and Detken, 2009; Bordo and Haubrich, 2010; Drehmann and Juselius, 2014).
In particular, regulators are concerned that the extent to which shocks are amplified
across equity markets is directly related to the degree of vulnerability in the network. We
address this problem by examining both transmission and vulnerability.
This paper considers a broad set of global equity indices, investigating their complex
interconnections. We build on the growing literature on time varying systemic risks, ly-
ing within complex market networks, (Giraitis et al., 2016; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015;
Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014) and with theoretical underpinnings in modern economic net-
work theories (Anufriev and Panchenko, 2015; Glover and Richards-Shubik, 2014). We
first, make use of the robust DY measure to investigate the contribution of each individ-
ual market or market cluster onto all other markets, and highlight events associated with
systemic network instability in the empirical evidence.
In identifying crisis transmission pathway pattern while making predictions on crisis
buildup we complement Sarlin and Peltonen (2013); Resta (2016). We propose a ‘crisis-
map’ similar to the map of Sarlin and Peltonen (2013), but compiled with connectedness
measures. This is a new use of SOM to better understand risk transmission pathway.
Earlier, Duffie (2013) proposed a risk topography with a 10 by 10 by 10 approach. We
countenance Duffie (2013) by proposing a 31 by 30 by 30 approach. In technical terms,
the stress topology in the maps are highlighted with a grid of 30 by 30 classification nodes
for each data point in the rolled over unsigned systemic risk index across entire sample
period, allowing us to visualize a gradual shift to crisis from non-crisis. The 70-30 split
of input data into train and test data allows us to incorporate in sample predictions in
the dynamic stress topology, while comparing the crisis occurrences in real time and with
unconditional spillover signals.
To our knowledge, no other paper has attempted to detect dynamic stress generation by
combining network topology and crisis transmission pathway predictions measured from
unsigned systemic risk index.
8Basel III has been criticized for failing to address the pro-cyclicality of stock markets and crises
(Saurina and Repullo, 2011).
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Empirical Framework
The Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) (DY) spillover methodology distinguishes spillovers be-
tween markets using VAR forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). The FEVD
matrix is used as the adjacency matrix (or ‘connectedness matrix’) between N co-variance
stationary variables with orthogonal shocks; net pairwise return spillovers between assets
form the elements of the bi-variate relationships between the markets in a network. The
overall spillover index is formed by adding all the non-diagonal elements of the decompo-
sition.
From a VAR(p) of the form9
xt =
p∑
i=1
ϕixt−i + εt (1)
where xt is a vector of stock returns, xt = (x1t,....xNt)
′, ϕi is a squared parameter matrix
and εt ∼ N(0, Σ). The corresponding moving average representation is
xt =
∞∑
i=0
Aiεt−i. (2)
in which,
Ai = φ1Ai−1 + φ2Ai−2 + . . .+ φHAi−H .
To circumvent the order variation issue Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) use generalized H-
step-ahead forecast error variance decomposition, (where H is user defined), constructed
exploiting the generalized VAR framework (GVD) of Koop et al. (1996). This is denoted
by θgij (H) and given as
θgij (H) =
σ−1jj
∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
ej
)2∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
A
′
hei
) (3)
where Σ is the variance co-variance matrix, σjj is the standard deviation of error term for
j th equation, Ah is the coefficient matrix in the infinite moving average representation
from VAR. At this stage,
∑N
j=1 θ
g
ij (H) 6= 1.
Normalizing each row of the adjacency matrix gives
θ˜gij (H) =
θgij (H)∑N
j=1 θ
g
ij (H)
. (4)
By construction
∑N
j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = N . DY index captures the full
sample static spillover by measuring the sum of off-diagonal elements as a proportion of
9The intercept is suppressed for simplicity and without loss of generality.
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the sum of all elements as the system-wide connectedness. The directional spillover index
identifies variance spillovers of all other markets to market i as
Si←all (H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i θ˜
g
ij (H)
N
× 100 (5)
and the reverse directional spillover measures volatility spillover from market i to all other
markets similarly as Si→all, generating θ˜gji (H) parameters.
The net pairwise spillover or pairwise directional connectedness identifies gross shock
transmission TO and FROM sample markets. The net spillover between markets i and j
is defined as
Snetij (H) = Si→j (H)− Sj→i (H) . (6)
In other words, we compute the transmission and vulnerability matrices from pairwise
directional connectedness matrices.
Common network statistics include measures for nodes concerning directional connected-
ness for links from other nodes as in-degree connectedness and measures of connectedness
to other nodes as out-degree connectedness. System-wide connectedness can be measured
via mean degree weight measures as in Diebold and Yilmaz (2015).
Crisis-Map Method
With the crisis-map we investigate crisis transmission in global equity indices, by showing
how markets evolve during a crisis period. Changes in the location of market clusters in
space allows us to identify the possible pathways of lurking crisis in the system.
The self organizing crisis-map makes use of artificial neural network clustering in visual-
izing the data space. Essentially it implements a non linear projection from a potentially
high dimensional input space onto a potentially lower dimensional array of nodes (nodes
are also known as neurons in this literature), and as such represents a neural network. In
principal, Self Organizing Maps attempt to preserve neighborhood relations by mapping
from an n dimensional array of input vectors into a k dimensional array of output nodes.
The process applies clustering techniques to assign nodes to their closest cluster via a
number of steps. First, a lattice is populated with regular array of randomly generated
synaptic weights or centers, in practice initialized with a PCA (Principal Component
Analysis) surface. The iterative SOM algorithm, minimizes a loss function scanning
across all data points in the input vector, and updates positions on the centers (weights)
recursively. The updating process is initiated by reducing the distance, between the input
vector and randomly generate weight vector, in other words, the loss function . Although,
the position of input vectors remain unchanged, the synaptic weights are associated with
nodes in the euclidean space. By finding the least distant input node from the synaptic
10
weight vectors, we find the least distant nodes with input vector in the neighborhood
space, best known as the "Best Matching Units" (BMU). The algorithm works in neigh-
bourhood space, so that closer neighbours have greater weight. This eventually results in
a surface of weights resembling a sphere around the lattice. Updating and convergence
may be achieved by using the usual gradient descent method. Finally, the non-linear
structure of the data is fitted optimally around the lattice, shaping a sphere of clusters,
that can be presented in a two dimensional grid of nodes 10.
In the process of dimensionality reduction with projection and clustering, SOM method
also produces robust predictions in the patterns outlined. The process involves moving
nodes across Euclidean space: predictors are organised for nodes (say for example equity
indices where each return represents a node) and are grouped into intermediate vectors,
which in this case are fewer in number than the initial input vectors11. In other words,
p distinct training vectors, equivalent to intermediate nodes are selected from the input
data. Usually, the training data includes at least 80 percent of the sample data. The prob-
lem is represented by two dimensional array of predictions, a process involving random
initialization of synaptic weights that we feed into the recursive optimization function,
and an updating algorithm until the local minima for the loss function is achieved. The
aforementioned updating algorithm leads to output nodes serving as prediction vectors
or classifiers in unsupervised clustering. The nodes of the output vectors represent the
topology that outlines the structure of the degree of temporal non-linear clustering in the
data. The input and output nodes are connected via the weight vectors which project
each node in the input vector onto each node in the output vector.
It is notable, that that the backward propagation with random wight generations iterates
with a convergence criteria. Hence, patterns produced in this process are much more
robust then contemporary methods of clustering in place.
The process proceeds in five steps producing graphical representation of predictions and
classifiers. First, a random weight matrix is generated. Second, the algorithm goes on
selecting sets of input nodes and updating the weights via backward propagation (the
analytic gradients of the weights construct the hidden layers of edges) and then updating
the decay function which governs the relationships with neighbours. In each case the Best
Matching Unit (BMU) is found by selecting the Euclidean norms, ε. The convergence
criterion provides stability in the projection by centering the ε, that is looking for a total
zero error. The visualization initiates at this stage with reinforcing of sparcity associated
with the decay function.
10see Sarlin and Peltonen (2013) for a graphical representation SOM
11The intermediate step offers increased robustness to the crisis-map.
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The neighborhood around the BMU follows an exponential decay function12
σt = σ0exp
(−tλ−1)
where, σ0 is the lattice at time zero, t is the current period and λ is a conditional element.
The purpose of the hyper-parameter is to regularize the decay function with penalty for
non-convergence, reducing the complexity of the process. In the final stage, weight vectors
continuously re-position with neighboring weights changing the most around BMU as
reflected by the decay rate. The learning rate ξ decays with ξt = ξ0exp(−tλ
−1). Here, the
one-step ahead weight function is represented as,
wt+1 = ωt + θtξtεt.
Finally, the neighborhood meets the convergence criteria (zero in theory), resulting in a
lower dimensional response vector. The influence rate13
θt = exp
(
− ε
2
t
2σ2t
)
describes the degree of influence for each weight of the response units on the convergence
algorithm. This rate is non-zero for the nearest neighbors to BMU and decreasing with
distance from BMU.
The neighborhood positions of the clusters in the crisis map represent contagion trans-
mission in the approach of Sarlin and Peltonen (2013). In the crisis maps the degree of
convergence are illuminated with darker to lighter colored grids in resembling no economic
events to some degree of events that ensues. Failure of convergence represents heightening
of non-linearity between nodes, indicated with cracks in the topology.
Data
We collect equity market indices from Datastream, pre-process the source data to control
for missing values, estimate spillover indices and subsequently use the spillover indices
as source data for ‘crisis-maps’. Our raw data are daily dollar denominated stock price
indices for 31 equity indices from Asia, Pacific, Europe, Americas and the Middle East14,
for the period beginning from 1st of January, 1998 up until 15th of September, 2017. This
period includes at least 10 major episodes of financial stress as documented in Table 1.
We transform the price indices to returns as the first difference of natural logarithms.
Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2014) we filter
12The computational graph of this function takes up a similar structure as that of information pro-
cessing within our brain neurons, hence the term neural network is loosely used.
13This rate substitutes the largely known score function in generalized neural network architecture.
14List of the countries is presented in introduction section.
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estimated returns with two day moving average to ameliorate the time zone effects on the
data. Essentially, the moving average filter concentrates out the sharpest edge points,
reducing white noise. This approach underpins much of the predictive and network lit-
erature; see for example Joseph et al. (2017); Zhong and Enke (2017); Elliott and Tim-
mermann (2016); Chen et al. (2016); Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011); Vaisla and Bhatt
(2010); Atsalakis and Valavanis (2009); Cont et al. (2001); Granger (1992); Balvers et al.
(1990); Fama (1976). Cont et. el. (2001)
Joseph et al. (2017) and Smith et al. (1997) point out that, a moving average (MA)
handles discrete time series more subtly than other approaches, despite its simplicity.
Hence, we choose the moving average filter for signal processing. The correct choice of
window size is important. We conduct multiple trials and find that window size of 2 is the
robust choice, complementing the notion of Spectral Windowing presented in Oppenheim
and Schafer (2014); Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
Empirical Results
In this section we present the results from estimating interconnectedness between the 31
equity indices with the transmission pathway outlined in crisis-maps.15
Dynamic Analysis
To analyze temporal risk associations among the markets, we construct the DY rolling
sample indices to assess both transmission and vulnerability. Following Diebold and
Yilmaz (2012) we begin by considering a 100 day rolling window to construct the Diebold
and Yilmaz Connectedness Index (DYCI). We choose a 10 day ahead horizon, H = 10
for the forecast error variance decomposition, also consistent with Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012).16 We retain the important edges by generating signals with 200 day moving
average window.
Since the unfolding of the recent Russian ruble crisis leading to the dampening of global
exports, investigations into the dynamic contemporaneous relationships between different
markets have flourished (Demirer et al., 2018a; Capponi, 2016; Diebold et al., 2017;
Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2018; Demirer et al.,
2018c; Liu et al., 2017; Malik and Xu, 2017; Vergote, 2016; Badshah, 2018; Liow, 2015;
Andrada-Félix et al., 2018; Ghulam and Doering, 2017; Chiang et al., 2017; Badshah,
15A section on static networks is presented in the online Appendix A. Counterfactual rolling plots and
counterfactual crisis maps are presented in online Appendix B.
16Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) demonstrate that the spillover indexes are not particularly sensitive to
the choice of forecast horizon over 4 to 10 days.
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2018). We complement these studies by investigating the dynamics in a multi-cluster
representation.
Rather than analyzing DY indices for every market individually we classify the sample
markets into Asian Crisis (AC), Export Crisis (EC), Greek Crisis (GC), Oil Exporting
Emerging (OEE) and Oil Exporting Developed (OED) markets. We construct rolling
indices for transmissions and vulnerability and present them jointly.
In Table 1, we model all the crisis events across the sample period using DY rolling indices
and find rational for important data points. Table 1 summarizes all the important edges
in the figures presented in this section. Here we record the spikes in transmissions and
vulnerabilities. Most often, a spike would shift the curves up to a new level and the curves
remain upstream until a new spike emerges. This can be hold also for a curve sliding
downstream.
We plot the ‘TO’ and ‘FROM’ DY indices for AC & EC, OEE & OED and the GC markets
together in Figures 1 to 3. Plotting the ‘TO’ and ‘FROM’ signals together for transmission
and vulnerability allows us to examine whether a higher transmitter also exhibits strong
vulnerability; or, if vulnerability is heightened more in response to a local event than a
global one. We also examine whether the transmissions and vulnerabilities are counter-
cyclical for specific markets. In the following discussion we present a comparative analysis
of Figures 1 to 3 with effects of oil inclusion in Figures 4 to 6. In Figure 6 we also include
commodity compared to oil for investigating potential risks ensuing from Greek Crisis
markets in light of findings outlined in the literature.
In all the cases examined, and for the majority of the time period, the transmission
estimates are higher than vulnerabilities. This points out that usually the contribution
of own shocks is dominant in explaining variation in any individual market’s return, and
the total impact of other countries is relatively small. The larger transmissions represent
that all the markets are highly interconnected, since the total spillovers to all others can
be quite large despite individual (bi-variate pairwise) effect on others is relatively small.17
The changing interconnectedness of the markets is clear from the results in Figures 1
to 3. Periods of crisis are distinguished in each of the panels of figures by a widening
of the gap between transmission and vulnerability - transmissions tend to be higher
and vulnerability - lower. The higher transmissions represent that when a market is
experiencing crisis conditions it is more vulnerable to transmission from other markets
(this form of increased connectedness is denoted hypersensitivity in Dungey, Milunovich
and Thorp, 2010a). The lower vulnerabilities suggest the reduction in the effect of own
shocks on others during periods of turmoil.
17See Table A1 in online Appendix A.
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Asian Crisis
During the Asian crisis of 1997-98 authorities resorted to different intervention strategies
to stem the tide of crisis. Thailand adopted a structural adjustment package; Malaysia
moved from a floating to fixed exchange rate regime; Indonesia adopted inflation targeting
policy and moved to a floating exchange regime; the South Korean currency devalued and
eventually floated, see Khan and Park (2009). Conversely, Singapore retained its managed
currency float and China did not intervene.
Figure 1, shows transmission and vulnerability indices for the ACmarkets (India, Malaysia,
Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand). Our focus is on spillover effects,
so own effects are excluded from our discussion. The contrast between the signals for
Malaysia and Thailand provides a pertinent example of the features attributed to equity
markets during the crises. Thailand is commonly viewed as the originator of shocks for
the Asian crisis. This is evident in its heightened transmissions at that time and again in
the Global Financial crisis (GFC) period, possibly due to concerns about feedback effects
on its economy. We find that both transmission and vulnerability amplifies for Thailand
following the 2006 period. In contrast, Malaysia, was highly affected by the Asian Crisis,
despite not being a crisis transmitter. It experienced a large increase in its transmissions
at that point followed by decline in the relative effect.
The swings are much more substantial for India in the post Asian Crisis period.18 For
both India and the Philippines reversions quickly followed a spike in transmissions in the
burgeoning GFC period.
Interestingly, the patterns for both Singapore and South Korea unveils a key finding. The
signals point out that both the markets reflect a turning point in vulnerability appear-
ing at the same time, between 2003-2004. Up until this point vulnerability decelerates
gradually, rationalizing the benefits of flexible policy interventions in the post Asian crisis
period, where a number of IMF programs and reforms were carried out over the late part
of the previous decade. Vulnerability continued to amplify past the turning points for
these markets.
In the post Asian crisis the decelerating cyclical patterns in crisis transmission and vul-
nerability supports the emergence of AC markets as safer investment venues relative to
some other markets in our sample.
18Indian data is sourced from Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). BSE is not only the largest in the
world in terms of a number of listed companies, it is also in the top 10 in the world in terms of market
capitalization.
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Export Crisis
The second panel in Figure 1 presents the exporting (EC) markets of Germany, Chile,
France, China, UK and Australia. Higher transmission and vulnerability in EC markets
correspond to the aftermath of drops in exports preceded by the Russian ruble crisis in
2014 following trade sanctions and military actions. Intuitively, the export crisis may
also appear from the 2016 crude oil price drop.
We account for several key features extracted from Figure 1 in the vulnerability of systemic
risks. We find a brief period of dampening precedes further amplification for Germany at
the same point as that of Singapore and Korea. Similar turning point is also detected in
Australian pattern but appearing much later. This suggests, that German transition is
driven by the same force that exists for Singapore and South Korea, whereas Australian
transition reflects emanating GFC. Australia has managed to see slowly reducing vul-
nerability and increasing transmission over the period. A second key feature is turning
points in the curves of the UK and France leading to sharp rise in vulnerability becomes
apparent facing European crisis only. Finally, we detect such degree of transitions for
China facing the very recent 2015-16 Chinese stock market turbulence.
The Chinese market is fraught with speculations of a crisis in the market(Forum, 2015;
Mauldin, 2017; Elliott, 2017; Chiang et al., 2017; Mao, 2009). The speculations are fuelled
further with the building up of 2015-16 stock market crash preceding a pronounced rise in
both vulnerability and transmission. Moreover, with relatively low vulnerability and high
transmission during GFC, Chinese market established exemplary resilience19. With the
recent deterioration of Chinese resilience, casting risks in Chinese stock markets within
systemic risk framework requires further examining before we postulate China to be the
ground zero for the next global financial crisis.
Oil Exporting Markets
Now we explore the impact of exogenous factors such as oil indices into the system by
examining the changes brought about as well as for robustness in the transmission and
vulnerability dynamics for both AC and EC clusters in Figure A4. We account for the
heightened systemic risk between China and Germany leading to other EC markets in
Figure 1 with robustness delivered in Figure 4. We find that including oil results in
systemic risk stemming more from France and the UK than others. Turning to AC
markets in the other panel of the same figures, we do not find any substantial up or
down swings for the AC markets with the inclusion of exogenous factor. This suggests,
Asian markets have better resilience to oil shocks than other markets within systemic risk
19This may be presumably due to China’s strongly growing domestic economy and timely policy
interventions contributing in the economy going upstream facing the Global Financial crisis.
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framework.
We show the spillovers of the OED and the OEE markets (OED comprises the USA,
Canada, Russia, Norway, Japan and New zealand, while OEE includes the Saudi Arabia,
Israel, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Venezuela) in Figure 2. Again, we compare Figure 1
for robustness including oil in Figure 5.
We find acute swings in transmission and vulnerability for Oil Exporting Developed mar-
kets highlighted in Figure 2. With the exception of Japan, this is true for Venezuela20, the
USA, Canada, Russia and Norway. We find both Venezuelan and Russian transmissions
exceed the aggregate levels during the episodes of US-led Iraq invasion; in the unveiling
of GFC, throughout the European debt crisis and the Russian Crisis. We also find that
despite continuing increases in Venezuelan amplitudes, resilience in the Russian market
intensifies. Additionally, Norwegian market resilience remains stronger relative to the
aforementioned markets, but weaker than that of the USA and Canada.
Turning to OEE markets plotted in the second panel of Figure 2, we observe that since the
Iraq invasion, Saudi Arabia and Israel have been the highest transmitters and recipients
of return shocks, particularly in Middle East. While only a few cycles of transmissions
and vulnerabilities are discernible for the Saudi Arabia and Israel during the outbreak
of GFC, these pick up dramatically during the period of plunging oil prices in 2016. In
the following years vulnerability increases for the Saudi Arabian markets. The remainder
of the markets in OEE and OED clusters have been less resilient since the GFC with
increasing systemic risk, similar to the results for the EC and GC markets.
The results for including oil shocks in these groups are presented in Figure 5 . We find
stronger fluctuations of transmission/vulnerability for Iraq, Kuwait, the Saudi Arabia,
Israel, Norway and Russia. Moreover only to Venezuela, Norwegian swings exceed that of
the others in these clusters. While Norway shows heightened vulnerability to oil shocks in
recent times; prior to the invasion of Iraq, Iraq’s responsiveness to oil shocks was highest.
Our results support heightened fragility in energy exporting markets, heralding an in-
crease in systemic risk. We do not find any dampening in the spillovers with the inclusion
of oil shocks in Figure 5.
Greek Crisis
A major crisis since the Global Financial Crisis is the European debt crisis, erupting in
late 2009, finding its way to major European markets. Studies in this vein suggests, the
crisis spread quickly, even before policymakers became aware of the serious troubles facing
20Chen et al. (2002) suggests Venezuela is an important representative of Latin American markets. Up
until 1999 there was no visible diversification in Venezuelan market due to its high level of integration
with other Latin American markets.
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the European markets; see for example (Jolly and Bradsher, 2015; Mink and De Haan,
2013; Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Jolly and Bradsher, 2015). In Figure 3, we present
the dynamic analysis for the GC cluster. Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Croatian and Belgian
systemic risk estimates continue to amplify up until 2016. The transmissions for all the
markets remain high. In essence, we identify an overall upward shift in the transmissions
of GC markets over the 20 years, with heightening vulnerability for Greece, UK, Ireland
and Belgium in recent times.
Aiming to explain resilience in the GC markets, we point out key features in vulnera-
bility. Vulnerability remained upstream for Greece, Portugal and Ireland up until the
post European Crisis period. We detected a brief dampening in vulnerability only to be
picked up much more substantially facing the smaller crises emerging in post European
crisis. The recent jump in vulnerability is the highest amplification that heralds a crisis
may emanate from within the GC cluster.
The results complement Ghulam and Doering (2017) by identifying higher connectivity
of GC markets to EC, CE, OED and OEE markets. The gyrations in GC markets suggest
that crisis conditions have not subsided for this cluster. The picture that emerges suggest
that a larger crisis may erupt from Greece or other GC markets.
Including Oil and Commodity in Figure 6, we record amplification in overall transmission
and vulnerability. This cements the robustness of our analysis while suggesting that GC
markets are vulnerable to exogenous shocks to a lesser extent than that of EC, OED and
OEE markets.
We again find a turning point of similar degree for Belgium from dampening to magnifica-
tion appearing at the same time as Germany, Singapore, Korea and some other markets.
Next we explain what causes these transitions in vulnerabilities to appear together.
Conduit effects
We detected transitions from dampening of vulnerability to amplification for Germany,
Singapore, South Korea and Belgium appearing at the same time in the beginning of
2000 in Figures 1 to 3. We aim to present rationalization for such collinear movements
in vulnerability.
In Figure 2, we find the same turning point in the vulnerability curve appears for the
USA and Japan at the same time with aforementioned markets, but to a much higher
degree then others. BIS (1998) summarizes that the USA and Japan were found to
be conduits if not ground zero of earlier crisis events. In light of this discussion, we
have detected the conduit effects of the USA and Japan to Germany, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Belgium and Australia. The crises that transpired in the USA from dot comm
bubble and the subsequent energy crisis is exerted upon Japan, South Korea, Singapore,
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Germany, Belgium and Australia resulting in the corresponding transition from low to
high vulnerability estimates together at the same point in the plots. This may be due to
high volume of trade between these markets with the USA and Japan at one point. In
short, we have captured the conduit effects outlined in Baur and Schulze (2005).
Crisis Maps
We now take the DYCI spillover indices generated in the previous section as inputs to
produce crisis maps in the form of Self-Organizing Maps.
Using DYCI as the data input rather than historic returns or financial indicators as in
earlier papers (Marghescu et al., 2010; Sarlin and Peltonen, 2013; Betz et al., 2014) or
log prices in (Resta, 2016) we are able to provide a new way of examining systemic
risks, highlighting the interconnectedness and spillovers of the system particularly in
representing the paths of vulnerability in the system.
Our main contribution is to present meaningful visualizations of high dimensional inputs.
The generated topology of the markets illuminate hidden overlapping and non-linear
dependencies. Such technical representation is achieved by defining the topology with
SOM Best Matching Units (BMU) discussed earlier.
An important novelty lies in our dynamic (windowed) mapping approach. We disaggre-
gate our original map to thirty-nine (39) successive maps, sampling at roughly 135 rows
(semi-annually) for each iteration. We extend the number of replications until all the
5041 rows are mapped. This approach allows us to visualize and examine the changing
degree and direction of contagion during different crisis. What lies closest to the spirit
of this paper is León et al. (2017) proposing hierarchical clustering of estimates derived
from indirect networking methods.
Figure 7 presents the full-sample crisis map generated with SOM using unconditional
spillover measures. The horizontal and vertical axes present the markets individually
and in clusters. The representation is similar to a heat-map with reordered column
positions. The degree of crisis is depicted with lighter to darker colors. The classifications
lie between no events (when the convergence in loss function is successful) to events
(when loss function is not optimally minimized for as non-linearity heightens in places).
Crisis transmission is drawn along the path of events across contemporaneous market
links. Additionally, the transmission pathway separates changing stress levels naturally
clustered together for all data points.
We interpret the graphs as following. The darker colors represent fissures in a plateau of
the mid-colors with occasional lighter colored higher features. To continue the analogy
if we consider a shock as some form of flash storm somewhere in the system, then the
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fissures represent the path into which the storm-water will drain. Deeper fissures will
attract more water. This refers to the areas that are most vulnerable. The pathways
visible on the plots represent the path of least resistance for shock transmission through
the system. For example, in Figure 7, it is clear that the markets from South Korea to
Israel on the map are highly vulnerable to a shock from the US (shown on the horizontal
axis). We see topographic depressions are deeper as the fissures run across GC to OED
clusters. Depressions are deeper again as the crack runs through EC to AC cluster. The
dislodging on the plateau forming the fissure represents the vulnerability pathway in the
system carrying crisis across the system. Here, Figure 7 gives us a parabolic pattern in the
fissures pathway that connect the major topographic depressions. Now we are presented
with the question if these fissures are more ephemeral than long lasting.
All these figures representing dynamics in crisis maps over nearly two decades, breaks
down to semi-annual time periods in Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 to show
the evolving vulnerabilities of the financial networks. In the first half of 1998, during the
Asian crisis, there is a substantial web of fissures connecting many markets in the system.
The vulnerability of the system to shocks is evident. This begins to ease in the second
half of 1998 and into 1999. Throughout 1999 and 2000, the activity transmission loops
at the right hand side of the figures are especially apparent. These maps show the high
vulnerability of the OED markets, and increasingly the AC markets to shocks originating
from the EC markets. Interestingly, there is little vulnerability to transmission from
the US across markets either before or after the dot-com crisis (with the exception of
Australia). By 2004, vulnerability to US sourced shocks evinces as a source of global
vulnerability (on the left hand side of the figures) and this continues right up until early
2007. However, this does not identify the most vulnerable pathway. Instead, by 2007
markets are most vulnerable to shocks emerging from the EC countries. This possibly
reflects the anticipated effects on their economies of the slowdown of the booming demand
for exports due to high growth in Asia, perhaps as an indirect consequence of the reduced
activity in the US following the crisis. For the following years the primary source of
vulnerability in the system remains around the role of shocks from EC markets, and with
shocks that affect those markets themselves (across the top of the figures).
Although we have presented how vulnerability pathway, or in other words, crisis trans-
mission pathway in analogy to storm water mounds change along the web of fissure across
the plateau, we have detected a common parabolic pattern in the fissures running from
end to end throughout the plateau (the system). More coverings open up as new events
are triggered and the bedrock is riddled with openings in major events, the running of
storm water, drawing an analogy to crisis transmission is temporal. The new cracks fill
up quickly, and the system remains with the common pattern in the pathway of crisis
transmission over the entire sample period. This is a new finding presented for the first
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time in the vein of crisis prediction.
There are interesting small surges of vulnerability evident in hot-spots, which we denote
sinkholes, in a number of the figures. According to Davis et al. (2010); Khandani et al.
(2013) an adverse feedback loop spreads across sectors as deadly doom loop (Farhi and
Tirole, 2017) and across international equity markets as diabolic loop(Brunnermeier et al.,
2016) . We visualize crises spreading across different clusters in the system as a feedback
loop completes circle within a cluster and find such sinkholes appearing in the system
in 2004:1 for GC, 2004:2 for OED, 2006:1 and 2006:2 for AC, 2008:2 for GC, 2012:2 for
EC and 2014:1 for OEE. Moreover, we find multiple sinkholes appearing in the maps for
2009:1 for GC, OED, OEE; 2010:1 for GC and OED; 2016:2 for EC. However, we are
faced with the question on the importance of these sinkholes. Are these sinkholes random
appearances? Can we predict crisis forming from these sinkholes?
As per Brunnermeier et al. (2016) diabolic feedback loops transmits risks across capital
markets as cascading common equities pooled in SIFIs, indicates a buildup of crisis across
national borders. This in turn results in a global contagion. Turning to the first half of
2006, we detect sinkholes creeping up into the system. Can we expect that we will see
crisis erupting in the following period? We see rapid dislodging on the plateau in the next
period. Moving along, we show new web of deeper fissures opening up along with new
sinkholes facing the GFC in 2007. Further, the parabolic pattern in the fissures pathway
that remained in calm times, is overlain with many new fissures. Crisis transmitted
everywhere along the path of the common pattern. As the effect of crisis subdues, we see
these new deeper fissures are filled up and the common parabolic pattern or the common
fissure resumes. Again, in 2008 and in 2010 we detect unanticipated sinkholes emerging in
the plateau. In both cases, the following period brings in many new openings and fissures
with voids exceeding normal times leading to major crisis erupting throughout the system
as heightened vulnerability is spread across the system. In the first case, we see a sudden
spike in ongoing crisis, and we are faced with the European crisis in the latter case.
In all cases examined, we conjecture that the openings into random sinkholes heralds
imminent crisis and heightening of transmissions across the system. In the dissemination
of a crisis event, the system reverts back to the common parabolic pattern. This is a new
presentation in this vein of studies in terms of both long term persistence of commonality
in transmission pathway and early warning system.
In contrast, we also capture strong endogenous crisis transmission in our system of dy-
namic mapping. For example in 2009:1 a strong vulnerability is revealed for AC markets
and oil exporting emerging markets, with the sources from the USA, Australia, and India.
In 2010:2 there is vulnerability for the USA and Australia from the Asian markets. This
is consistent with the resilience of the Asian markets in resisting the effects of the Greek
and European debt crises.
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In our DY spillover analysis, the total spillover index reached an all-time high by the end
of the sample for China. A number of papers focused on China as a potential source
market (Chiang et al., 2017; Forum, 2015; Elliott, 2017; Mullen, 2017; Mauldin, 2017;
Forum, 2015; Cheng, 2017). However, the full visualizations in the crisis maps do not
support the conclusion that China is the source of vulnerability in the system, in fact they
point more towards sensitivity to shocks from the GC and OED markets. In February
2018, this view was vindicated in the rapid transmission of shocks from the US sourced
drops in the Dow-Jones to the more developed markets of the world, with the patterns
largely consistent with the crisis map produced for 2017:1.
A complete counterfactual analysis results for dynamic spillover section and for the crisis
maps are presented in online appendix section B.
Policy Implications
One of the most appealing features of the crisis maps is that they are able to display
the changing nature of vulnerabilities within a financial system in a readily accessible
manner. Despite the usefulness and wide range of applications for the DY adjacency
matrix approach, complementary information can be obtained from crisis maps in terms
of both the amplification of spillovers and the emergence of specific areas of vulnerability.
The rolling spillover indices and the crisis maps both show that the system can move
dramatically. Consequently, the range of tools required by policy makers and portfolio
managers needs to be wide. In some instances shutting down a link between two markets
may protect other markets, but the results of our counterfactuals suggest that the effects
on the overall crisis map are not easily detected. Diagonal fissure lines across the system
result from cascades of shocks sourced at an origin market and traveling on via the fissures
in the system (eg US to Australia to Japan). The crisis maps highlight both the direct
and indirect nature of these relationships. In these cases, co-ordinated actions by many
markets may be an appropriate means to short-circuit a crisis. For example, by blocking
a pathway, perhaps through policy options such as short sales constraints, or short-term
capital movement restrictions.
In other cases sink-holes emerge. These are hot spots where there is a high level of
vulnerability for an individual market (or small number of markets) to shocks from a
single source (or small set of sources). In this case an apt policy response may be to
develop a domestic response to the cause of that vulnerability - possibly involving the
traditional repair of macroeconomic fundamentals such as proposed in first generation
crisis models; see, for example Eichengreen et al. (1996); Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999); Bordo et al. (2001).21
21Alternatively the cause may be vulnerability to structural issues such as high reliance on remittances.
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Conclusion
In this paper we present return spillover connectedness between major global markets
split into multiple categories based on their size, structure and roles played during major
financial crises periods. First, we make use of unconditional spillover measures to analyze
static networks of markets, and conditional spillover measures to analyze changing inter-
action of dynamics between major markets. Our analysis not only captures the degree
and direction of the episodes affecting 31 international equity markets in the past 20
years, but also allows us to explain how the strengthening of networks are responsible for
uncertainties.
This paper proposes a unique way of visualizing the changing vulnerability of a financial
network via automated neural networks (ANN), and by filtering on the largest vulner-
abilities provides crisis maps. These crisis maps highlight the least resistance shock
transmission pathways at any point in time. We show how ANN methods relate to the
commonly understood VAR representation and hence can be cast as an extension of the
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009); Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) approach.
Time shots provide ‘crisis-maps’ that detect the changes in vulnerability for markets over
time. Not only do we present a complete ‘crisis-map’ showing a conceptual pathway
for shock transmission, but we also give time varying patterns by presenting stepwise
windowed stress grids.
We investigate several issues that are central to scientific discourse in the systemic risk
tenet of studies. First, we provide evidence of timely intervention leading to reduction of
vulnerability and slipping out of crisis for many markets in the past. Second, our results
reflect that changing interaction between markets are inducing transmissions that were
considered vulnerable in the past, while postulated risky markets are not transmitting
risks Third, we demonstrate that AC cluster is more resilient then before. Fourth, we
conjecture that cutting links off may increase resilience for some countries in some cases,
the aberrations caused in the system instigates larger and quicker crisis transmission in
most cases. Fifth, we account for a common and persistent pattern in the pathway of
crisis transmission that is only disrupted in crisis periods. Finally, we propose a robust
way of crisis prediction with combining existing serving as early warning of crisis. Taken
together, these results confirm that the countries in a system alone cannot slip out of an
imminent crisis. Crucially, all countries in a system need to come together in order to
short-circuit an emerging crisis.
The ‘crisis-maps’ highlight both the vulnerability and resilience dynamics in the mar-
kets examined. With an eye to practical applications, the maps presents an opportunity
for investors and financial managers to diversify wealth better, enabling them to predict
riskiness patterns in their portfolios. Additionally, our dynamic mapping method of chan-
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nels of potential vulnerability enables policymakers to adopt proactive measures. Despite
arguably underestimating the importance of interconnectedness in the pre-GFC period,
policymakers have since realized the importance of identifying and co-ordinating their
responses to vulnerability to crises originating elsewhere (León et al., 2017). The pat-
terns observed in the crisis map are a means of visualising vulnerability to policymakers,
who may then base their decisions regarding actions towards channels which might be
worth restricting or encouraging, to protect individual markets from unfavourable shocks.
These tools may help to capture the complexity of the changing nature of integration of
world markets, and the changing vulnerabilites that are thrown up over time.
Our aim is to convincingly implement means by which crisis mangers can simulate the
effect of alternative intervention paths in a network and have some knowledge of where
the most effective interventions may lie given the structure of the network at any point
in time. Thus, we specifically acknowledge the conditional nature of the problem, and
that intervention strategies may need to be flexible and time-varying, responding to the
changing structure of the network and the many alternative possible sources of shocks.
Discussion
1. We present a filtered static network analysis in online Appendix section A. The
filtered static network in gauged from unconditional spillover measures. A static
table of generalized variance decomposition matrix is also presented here.
2. We present counterfactual conditional spillovers in figures B1 to B6, in online Ap-
pendix section B. The figures are referred in our discussion of dynamic analyses.
3. In an interesting development, we present a 10 basis crisis- classification table (Table
C1) and a 900 basis crisis-classification table (Table C2) in the online Appendix C.
Table C1 presents summary statistics for within 0-10 range crisis classifications,
that is a more simple and tractable presentation of condensed weights for every
data point used in the dynamic crisis-maps. Table C2 presents summary statistics
for within 0-900 (30 by 30 grid) range crisis classifications, reporting summary
statistics of condensed weights for every data point used in the dynamic crisis-
maps.The summary statistics are presented for equal number of subsets used as
in the dynamic crisis maps. Moreover, The sample data points are split into 70-
30 input train and simulated test data points, gauging from rolling vulnerability
spillover matrix. This additional section further adds to the robustness, tractability
and the predictability of the patterns presented in the paper. In that spirit, the
paper serves as a good addition to the early warning literature.
Tables C1 and C2 adds to the important implications of analyses presented in
this paper for early stress detection and subsequent policy decisions neutralizing
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such stress. While being flexible in the base selection, the updating algorithm
applied on vulnerability matrix make accurate predictions for heightened stress
generated during 2012, 2015 and 2016. We also detect high stress generation during
1998-1999, 2011-2002, 2006, 2007-2009. Additionally, we produce a 30 by 30 grid
stress classification in Table C4. The results complement our findings presented
in dynamic analysis and crisis map sections, while also serving as robustness for
complete analyses presented in this paper.
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Figure 1: Asian Crisis Markets & Export Crisis Markets
Note: This figure represents contemporaneous relationship of daily return data for 20 years, for markets
categorized within Asian Crisis (AC) and Export Crisis (EC) markets derived from generalized variance
decomposition.
Figure 2: Oil Exporting (Emerging) Markets & Oil Exporting (Developed) Markets
Note: This figure represents contemporaneous relationship of daily return data for 20 years, for markets
clustered within Emerging Oil Exporting countries (OEE) and Developed Oil Exporting Countries (OED)
Figure 3: Greek Crisis Markets
Note: This figure represents contemporaneous relationship of daily return data for 20 years, for sample
markets of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Croatia and Austria.
Note: For all the plots in this section the transmission and the receiving patterns are plot
together, with the same color in both the patterns is used for a given country.
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Figure 4: AC-EC spillovers [oil effect]
This figure represents the conditional spillovers with oil index as exogenous to AC and
EC blocks.
Figure 5: OED-OEE spillovers with [oil effect]
This figure represents the conditional spillovers with oil index as exogenous to OED and
OEE blocks.
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Figure 6: GC spillovers [Oil and Commodity effect]
This figure represent the conditional spillovers with oil and commodity index as exogenous
to the sample blocks.
Figure 7: Crisis-Map (full sample period)
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((a)) 1998:1 ((b)) 1998:2 ((c)) 1999:1
((d)) 1999:2 ((e)) 2000:1 ((f)) 2000:2
((g)) 2001:1 ((h)) 2001:2 ((i)) 2002:1
((j)) 2002:2 ((k)) 2003:1 ((l)) 2003:2
Figure 8: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 1998-2003
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((a)) 2004:1 ((b)) 2004:2 ((c)) 2005:1
((d)) 2005:2 ((e)) 2006:1 ((f)) 2006:2
((g)) 2007:1 ((h)) 2007:2 ((i)) 2008:1
((j)) 2008:2 ((k)) 2009:1 ((l)) 2009:2
Figure 9: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 2004-2009
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((a)) 2010:1 ((b)) 2010:2 ((c)) 2011:1
((d)) 2011:2 ((e)) 2012:1 ((f)) 2012:2
((g)) 2013:1 ((h)) 2013:2 ((i)) 2014:1
((j)) 2014:2 ((k)) 2015:1 ((l)) 2015:2
Figure 10: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 2010-2015
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Table 1: Major crisis events
Modelling crisis
Year Transmission- Markets Vulnerability-markets Crisis events
1998:1 Malaysia, The Phillipines, Croatia, Russia, Japan Greece, , Portugal, Ireland, Austria, USA, Japan,
Venezuela
1. 1997 Asian Financial Crisis continues.
2. Sourcing from the collapse of Thai baht, resulting in
Thailand becoming effectively bankrupt.
1998:2 Malaysia, India, The Philippines, Singapore, Australia,
Chili, Norway
Malaysia, Greece, , Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Croatia,
Austria, Japan, Venezuela
1. 1998 Russian Financial crisis- Devaluation of the ruble
followed by Russian Central Bank defaulting on its debt
2. 1998 Oil price crash follows
1999:1 Malaysia, The Phillipines, Singapore, South Korea,
Greece, , Portugal, Ireland, Croatia, Austria, Canada,
Russia, Norway, Japan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Nigeria,
Venezuela
Ecuador financial crisis followed by Brazilian Financial
crisis and South American economic crisis, effecting many
of the GC countries and spreading through the oil markets
into Oil dependent countries.
1999:2 USA, Russia, Iraq, Nigeria Malaysia, The Phillipines, South Korea, Germany,
France, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Saudi Arabia,
Nigeria, Venezuela
1998-1999 Russian Financial Crisis continues.
2000:1 India, South Korea, UK, France, Australia, Croatia,
Canada, New Zealand, Israel
Malaysia, The Phillipines, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Bel-
gium, Croatia, Austria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Venezuela
1. Early 2000s recession effecting Euroopean Union , the
USA (commencing).
2. Japan’s 1990s recession (the lost decade) continues.
2000:2 Malaysia, Singapore, Chili, Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
Austria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela
The dot com bubble leading to dot comm stock market
crash, effecting the USA and Canada mostly.
2001:1 Singapore, South Korea, China, Greece, Portugal, Ire-
land, Austria,USA, Canada, Russia, New Zealand, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Nigeria
The dot com crash continues.
2001:2 Chili, Japan, Iraq, Nigeria Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Canada, Russia,
Japan, Venezuela
1. Early 2000s recession continues.
2. Japan’s 1990s recession (the lost decade) continues.
2002:1 India, Croatia,Japan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Russia, Iraq 1. The dot com crash continue.s
2. Japan’s 1990s recession (the lost decade) continues.
2002:2 South Korea, Belgium,USA, Canada India, Chili, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Croatia, Austria,
Russia
1. US Stock marker crash in 2002 followed by excessive
speculations prevalent in 1997-2000 led from the Septem-
ber 2011 terrorist attack on US.
2. Enron bankruptcy , Tyco and Worldcom scandals ef-
fected energy stocks around the globe emerging from the
USA .
2003:1 Singapore, South Korea, Germany, UK, France, Croatia,
Saudi Arabia
India, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Canada, Russia 1. The dot com crash continues.
2. Japan’s 1990s recession continues.
continue on the next page
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Table 1: Major crisis events
Modelling crisis
Year Transmission- Markets Vulnerability-markets Crisis events
2003:2 The Philippines, Singapore, Russia, Sri Lanka India, China, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Iraq, Nigeria 1. Global energy crisis- Increasing tensions in Middle
East together with rising concerns over oil price specu-
lations followed by a significant fall of US dollar , resulted
in oil prices rise abruptly, exceeding three time the price
at the beginning.
2. SARS outbreak : First identified in Guangdong
province in China, rapidly took an epidemic form world-
wide, slowing down economic interactions with China to
many markets.
2004:1 The Philippines, Australia, Chili,USA, Canada, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Venezuela
India, South Korea,Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Croa-
tia,USA, Japan, Israel, Venezuela.
1. Global energy crisis continues.
2. The dot com crisis continues.
3. Japan’s 1990s recession continues.
2004:2 Croatia, Japan Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Venezuela Petrocurrency effect subdues
2005:1 South Korea, China, Iraq Singapore, Germany, France, Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
Belgium, Canada, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Sri
Lanka, Nigeria, Venezuela
1. Global energy market starts to recover.
2. With petrocurrency effect subsiding, this period sees
a buoyant global stock markets.
2005:2 Singapore, South Korea, Germany, Australia, Chili,
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Croatia, Canada, Venezuela
2006:1 South Korea, Russia, Norway,Japan, Saudi Arabia, Saudi
Arabia, Sri Lanka
Singapore, Greece, Portugal,USA, Iraq, Venezuela The GAZA conflict emerges, amplifying the energy crisis.
2006:2 India, UK, Canada, Nigeria The Philippines , South Korea, Greece, Portugal, Japan
2007:1 India, The Philippines, South Korea, Greece, Portugal,
Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Sri Lanka, Nigeria
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) emerges
2007:2 Thailand, The Philippines, India, The Singapore, South
Korea, UK, Australia, Chili, Ireland,USA, Canada, New
Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Venezuela
Thailand, Greece, Portugal, Canada, Russia, Norway,
New Zealand
2008:1 China, Chili, Ireland, Belgium, Saudi Arabia 1. The Global financial crisis continues.
2. Post 2008 Irish banking crisis ensues.
2008:2 India, Croatia Singapore, Thailand, Australia
continue on the next page
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Table 1: Major crisis events
Modelling crisis
Year Transmission- Markets Vulnerability-markets Crisis events
2009:1 Croatia, Austria, Canada, Russia, Norway, New Zealand,
Israel, Venezuela
China, Australia, Ireland, Belgium, Japan, Saudi Arabia,
Sri Lanka, Venezuela
1. 2008 -2011 Icelandic financial crisis leads to credit cri-
sis in UK, hurting the euro-zone areas to some extent.
2. Russian crisis: the great recession in Russia begins
resulting in a full fledged economic crisis in Russia.
3. Spanish financial crisis/ Great Spanish depression be-
gins.
4. Eurozone crisis/ Greek crisis: In the wake of Great
recession in the late 2009 , several Eurozone members
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) failed to
bailout over-indebted banks and repay foreign debt. 2009-
2010 Venezuelan banking crisis unearths.
2009:2 India, Singapore, Germany, UK, Nigeria China, Chili, Norway The post 2008 Irish banking crisis leaves German and
French banks exposed , having enormous foreign claims
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain (Greek crisis
countries).
2010:1 Belgium India, The Philippines, Croatia,USA, Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, Israel, Nigeria
2010:2 UK, France, Australia, Portugal, Croatia The Philippines, Singapore, Venezuela 1. Eurozone crisis/ Greek crisis deepens.
2. Spanish financial crisis/ Great Spanish depression fur-
ther fuels in the European sovereign debt crisis.
3. Venezuelan banking crisis continues.
4. Spanish financial crisis/ Great Spanish depression con-
tinues.
2011:1 The Philippines, Portugal, Japan, New-Zealand Russia, Norway, Sri Lanka, Venezuela 1. Eurozone crisis heightens.
2. Great Spanish depression contributes in the worsening
of Eurozone crisis.
2011:2 India, Belgium, USA, Saudi Arabia, Israel China, Croatia, New Zealand, Venezuela Heightening Eurozone crisis, Spanish crisis, Venezuelan
crisis reinforces feedback loops across global financial mar-
kets, recoupling emerging energy dependent and oil ex-
porting country’s markets. This in turn, reinforces risk
transmissions back into the USA.
2012:1 Germany, UK, France, Chili, Greece, Austria, Canada Singapore, South Korea,USA, Japan, Nigeria, Venezuela Eurozone crisis continues
2012:2 Germany, UK, France, New Zealand, Nigeria India, Singapore, South Korea, Chili
continue on the next page
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Table 1: Major crisis events
Modelling crisis
Year Transmission- Markets Vulnerability-markets Crisis events
2013:1 Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Venezuela India, Austria, Canada, Norway, New Zealand Eurozone crisis continues
2013:2 India, Chili, Austria, Russia, Norway Germany, France, Croatia, Japan Eurozone crisis continues
2014:1 India, Chili, Austria, Russia, Norway Germany, France, Croatia, Japan Commodity price drops with the slowdown in Chinese
economy, also contributing into a large scale Brazilian
economic crisis.
2014:2 Russia 2014-2015 Russian Financial crisis: Following eco-
nomic sanctions on Russia, plummeting global oil prices,
devaluation of Russian ruble and fire sale of Russian assets
all contributed in the development of a major financial
crisis in Russia.
2015:1 Greece, Croatia, Austria, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria,
Venezuela
Chili, Belgium, Austria, Canada, Norway, New Zealand,
Israel, Nigeria, Venezuela
2015:2 China, Canada India, The Philippines, South Korea,USA, Russia, Japan Corresponding to Russian Financial crisis, stock market
in the USA starts to decline.
2016:1 China, Venezuela India, The Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, France,
Australia, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Austria,USA, Rus-
sia, Norway, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria
1. Export Crisis: Germany, Chile, France, China, UK,
Australia among others experience historic decline in total
exports to others, followed by the so-called oil-glut.
2. Chinese crisis: A massive drop in Chinese stock
markets results in markets terminating transactions in the
wake of concerns over a Chinese Crisis, that eventually
took the shape of a global meltdown.
3. January 2016 global meltdown resulting from fire sales
of Chinese assets brought down the European and the
USA stock markets
2016:2 Greece, Portugal, Croatia, Austria, Russia, Japan
2017:1 UK, Australia, France, Chili, Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
Belgium, Croatia, Austria, Japan, New Zealand, Israel,
Nigeria, Venezuela
China, Russia, Japan, New Zealand 2016 global meltdown continues
2017:2 China, Australia, Chili, Ireland,USA, Canada, Russia,
Japan, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela
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Appendix A: Static filtered networks
In this section, we present the unconditional spillover generated from 31 equity markets
and draw dynamic filtered financial networks. The financial networks highlight the high-
est transmitters and receivers in aggregate terms. For better visualization we present
spatial maps showing the highest to lowest transmitters and receivers identified with
unconditional spillover measures.
Static Network
The estimated connectedness results for the full sample of 31 indices is shown in Table A1.
An element in the ith row and jth column of the matrix gives the percentage contribution
of the 10 day ahead forecast error variance decomposition to market i by market j. It
clearly shows that the main source of shocks to each market are via own shocks on the
main diagonal. Spillovers between markets are given by the off-diagonal elements. The
total directional connectedness (from all others excluding own shocks) to i is found in
the far right column of the table. The total connectedness to all others (excluding own
shocks) from j is found in the bottom row of the column. These are the components of
the DY index represented over the entire sample period.
Estimated vulnerability network plots, are shown in Figure A1 and Figure A2. The edges
in these figures represent Euclidean distance between the nodes. We further filter both of
the network plots to retain only the important linkages in the system. We use dynamic
filtering1 of the static networks to retain links where the strength is over 100 and 50
1We use the force directed algorithm proposed by Fruchterman and Reingold (1991). This method
1
percentage basis points, respectively in Figure A1 and Figure A2. We select the cutoff
points by estimating the averages of weights in percentage basis points and then consider
the upper points in the range. This allows us to concentrate on the important network
components of the system.
An appeal of the dynamic filtering is that it allows a more granular approach in explaining
the degree and direction of changing systemic risks within networks. Figure B1, represents
the links only when the shock transmission from the source nodes are higher than a
maximum threshold of 100 points. The picture that emerges from the dynamic filtering
highlights that Germany, Norway, Russia, Belgium, Canada, Sri-Lanka and the USA are
the main transmitting markets. Specifically, the highest spillovers come from Germany
and the USA to Australia, India and Iraq. The USA spills its shock to China, and
Germany transmits shocks to New Zealand.
Usefully, when we explain the degree of transmissions between two nodes with GVD
weights, the euclidean distance between nodes account for the speed of transmission.
We find that, while Germany transmits a higher degree of risk to Japan and Kuwait
than Australia, euclidean distance suggests that a crisis transmits faster to Australia and
Kuwait from Germany then to Japan. In other words, Japan will have more time to shift
policies resisting the crisis reaching Japanese markets in the case of a crisis erupting in
Germany, while Australia and Kuwait have considerably less time. The node locations
also indicate that, oil exporting markets in Middle East are highly vulnerable in terms
of both degree and direction of crisis emerging from the USA and to a lesser degree from
Russia. Interestingly, China is highly vulnerable only to a crisis erupting from the USA.
Figure A2 depicts vulnerabilities characterized by spillovers ‘FROM’ other markets. We
filter out shock received from the source nodes if higher than maximum threshold (50
percentage basis points). Figure A2 shows that Australia, Belgium, Austria, Germany,
New Zealand and the UK are the most vulnerable to crises generated elsewhere. Some
evidence is also provided on high vulnerability for China, Iraq, Kuwait, Sri Lanka and
Canada. Figure A2 further shows that vulnerability nodes spread out further than trans-
mission nodes. We interpret this as demonstrating the vulnerability of major markets to
others, implying that with the emergence of a crisis, all markets will fall victim where the
speed of transmission will vary with node distance.
Two dimensional networks represent a good way for presenting complicated estimates.
Yet, information is suppressed for limitations in the dimensions. We overcome these
limitations by producing interactive three dimensional networks.2 With three dimensional
is interactivity in terms of capturing changes between forces, and has a strong theoretical foundation
influenced by Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) theories. For more details see Fruchterman and Reingold
(1991).
2These results are available upon request.
2
networks, we find China and most middle eastern markets are close to each other while
all other nodes are clustered in regards to both transmission and vulnerability.
The network representations hold important information to aid with policy and invest-
ment decisions. The euclidean distance illustrating speed of transmission should allow
policy makers laying out plans to stay away from critical nodes.
3
Figure A1: Static Network- Major contributors
Note: Edge arrow size indicate directional connectedness To others. The weights of
networks are labeled on the edges. Here, the vertexes are filtered out based on weights
between 100-150 percentile point. The maximum edge weight is 150 percentile point.
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Appendix B
Counterfactual Analysis
Counterfactual conditional spillovers
Counterfactuals invoke causal relations alternative to the existing association by mod-
ifying past inputs. However, without access to controlled experimental conditions true
counterfactuals are almost impossible to perform in the literature. While critiques of
counterfactuals postulate that altering causal relations may generate erroneous results
(Dawid, 2000), the advocates of counterfactual analysis provide evidence of its useful-
ness, in that, results drawn from alternatives may help actions to mitigate undesirable
consequences from crisis conditions elsewhere in the network (Pearl, 2000, 2002). We
present counterfactual experiment results in this light.
We execute our counterfactual experiments by constraining selected effects in transmission
process, specifically by constraining a number of the largest identified bi-variate pairwise
linkages to zero. In policy terms we link this to a policy intervention designed to halt
transmission between two nodes.
The first counterfactual considers the case where all the large links either receiving or
transmitting identified as being over 100 basis points are set to zero. We then re-estimate
the spillover indices with those links set to zero and all other link values from the original
VAR retained.
We begin by presenting counterfactual dynamic conditional spillovers that marks crucial
changes with counterfactuals in Figure B1 and in Figure B2. Not all counterfactual
estimates capture substantial deviation from findings in non-counterfactuals.
We find transmissions around global financial crisis only amplifies for Australia, Israel,
Japan, South Korea and New Zealand when these market’s links with Germany is turned
off. The transmissions for these market’s exceed that of with all existing links. Interest-
ingly, the American transmissions spike up only when its link with New Zealand is turned
off. Seemingly, cutting links off, specifically with Germany, heightens risk transmissions
for all markets.
We focus on interesting findings with vulnerability spillovers when we turn individual
pairwise links off. We show that the entire Japanese vulnerability curve shifts down, or
in other words, Japanese market becomes stronger as we turn its link off with the USA.
Similarly, we show that Malaysian market becomes stronger when we cut its link off with
the USA. Put together, it is an interesting finding to see that strong links with the USA
market increases crisis related vulnerability for several countries that are the closest trade
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partners to the USA as well. We do not extract similar deviations neither in vulnerability
nor in transmission by conditioning on any other associations.
Moreover, two notable findings are presented here. We identify that the overall transmis-
sion and vulnerability for Australia amplifies for the entire cycles if Australian links to
both the USA and Germany is turned off. Also, We find the USA vulnerability increasing
substantially only when the links to New Zealand is turned off. It is evident from the
results that the USA market interdependence to New Zealand is stronger then others in
the cluster. This significant interdependence for both markets maybe attributable to the
phenomenal alternative investments between the USA and New Zealand as major energy
exporters in the same cluster.
The findings in Figure B1 and in Figure B2 supports our argument that limiting exposure
to certain markets may exacerbate systemic risks for others while serving as the dynamic
robustness of the unconditional connectedness presented in the dynamic analysis section
of the paper.
Crisis-maps
Now we set two conditions in counterfactuals. In counterfactual one we turn all big links
off altogether to re-examine changes in transmission pathways in crisis-maps. Then, in
counterfactual two we turn individual pairwise associations off for all markets as before 3.
These serves the purpose of explaining, if controlling for all big transmissions substantially
changes the transmission pathways while allowing us the flexibility to examine changes
in fissures with individual associations. Consequently, this either yields new information
or proves robustness in the visualizations.
We present full-sample crisis map generated with counterfactual one in Figure B3 and
with counterfactual two in Figure B4.
The picture that emerges from examining the full sample maps with the first restrictions
applied, is the fissures running left to right in Figure B3 replicates the pattern of fissures
produced with all links existing as found in Figure B7 of the main body of the paper,
but with voids deeper then Figure B7, carrying more storm water deposits (higher degree
of shocks) within them. This demonstrates that controlling for big transmissions, the
parabolic pattern in the transmission pathway is not hindered. Additionally, the figures
suggest that with counterfactual one severity of crisis intensifies while makes evident the
robustness of earlier crisis maps.
In contrast, Figure B4 lays out full sample map with only Germany-Australia links off. It
3In the spirit of capturing shocks received by home country, we only present maps with Germany-
Australia links off here. However, maps with all other links off, or any specific links off can be produces
and supplied upon request.
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is clear that the plateau is riddled with openings into deeper voids, and with new cracks
emerging within the parabolic pattern running from Germany to OED cluster, through
the GC cluster. This illustrates that with one major link off triggers crisis spreading all
over. This only reinforces the argument that we need to be cautious in selecting what
links to turn off if we want to short circuit an imminent crisis instead of exacerbating it.
We conclude that even if we shut off big links all together we retain some degree of
persistence in the patterns and the patterns remain predictable. Shutting off random
links only results in lose control over the patterns.
(a) Australian vulnerability:GER-AUS links off (b) USA vulnerability:USA-NZL links off
(c) JAP vulnerability:USA-JAP links off (d) MYS vulnerability:USA-MYS links off
Figure B1: Highest variations with individual links off
Figure B2: Australian Transmission with GER-AUS individual links off
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Figure B3: Counter-factual Full Sample Crisis Map. This figure represents a full sample crisis-map for
the complete period, with all big links off from bi-variate pairwise ‘TO’ estimates
Figure B4: Counter-factual Full Sample Crisis Map with only Germany -Australia link off. This figure
represents a full sample crisis-map for the complete period, with Germany - Australia links off from
bi-variate pairwise ‘TO’ estimates
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(a) 2008:1 (b) 2012:2
(c) 2008:1 (d) 2012:2
Figure B5: Change in global crisis transmission controlling for Australia and Germany link, compared
to controlling for all links in the post GFC and EC period
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Appendix C
In this section, we include a 10 basis crisis classification table, and a 900 basis gauged
from the SOM classification matrix. We generate a 0-10 degree range crisis classification
in Table C1 and 0-900 degree range crisis classification in Table C2 gauging from vul-
nerability matrix, for each data points across rolling samples. We use a 70-30 split for
test simulations based on training input. We then aggregate the classification vector into
39 subsets in compliance with the window size selection for dynamic ‘crisis-maps’. We
present summary statistics for each subset in tables C1 and C2. Table C2 presents the
summary statistics of generated classification weights forming the dynamic crisis maps.
Table C1 presents a simple range showing the robustness of self organizing maps gauging
from spillover indices. In addition, both the tables demonstrate the applicability of a
class of deep unsupervised learning classification on a conditional spillover index for crisis
prediction.
In our training sample, sample data spanning across years 1998 to 2011:1 is included.
The test simulation makes in sample predictions for 2011: 2 to 2017:1.
We find high degree of stress accumulation for 1998:2, 1999:1, 1999:2, 2001:2, 2002:1,
2006:1, 2007:1, 2007:2,2008:1, 2008:2, 2009:1, 2010:2, 2011:1. What is more, the test sim-
ulations make accurate predictions for stress generated in the years 2012, 2015 and 2016.
The summary statistics shown in this table complements our findings in dynamic analysis
and dynamic crisis-map sections. Also, the tables add to the robustness, tractability and
the predictability of the patterns presented in the paper.
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Table C1: Summary Statistics of 10 basis crisis classification
Actual 1998:1 1998:2 1999:1 1999:2 2000:1 2000:2 2001:1 2001:2 2002:1 2002:2 2003:1 2003:2 2004:1 2004:2 2005:1
Min. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1st Qu. 1.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 1.00 4.00
Median 3.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Mean 3.92 5.95 6.22 6.19 3.55 5.50 5.24 6.40 6.65 4.50 4.64 5.12 3.78 4.75 5.19
3rd Qu. 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00
Max. 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Actual 2005:2 2006:1 2006:2 2007:1 2007:2 2008:1 2008:2 2009:1 2009:2 2010:1 2010:2 2011:1
Min. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1st Qu. 1.00 8.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00
Median 6.00 8.00 5.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 9.00
Mean 4.65 7.58 5.78 7.90 8.15 6.17 8.08 6.98 5.20 5.39 6.84 6.96
3rd Qu. 7.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 9.00
Max. 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Prediction 2011:2 2012:1 2012:2 2013:1 2013:2 2014:1 2014:2 2015:1 2015:2 2016:1 2016:2 2017:1
Min. 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1st Qu. 3.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 4.00 4.00
Median 3.00 9.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 5.00 9.00 8.00 5.00 5.00
Mean 5.17 8.35 5.92 5.59 4.94 4.86 5.37 5.45 8.01 7.94 5.30 4.95
3rd Qu. 8.00 10.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 7.00
Max. 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Table C2: Summary Statistics of 900 basis crisis classification
Actual 1998:1 1998:2 1999:1 1999:2 2000:1 2000:2 2001:1 2001:2 2002:1 2002:2 2003:1 2003:2 2004:1 2004:2 2005:1
Min. 51.00 3.000 19.00 8.000 2.000 11.00 37.00 39.00 59.00 21.00 48.00 25.00 129.00 45.00 80.00
1st Qu. 421.0 181.0 253.0 127.0 309.0 92.00 322.0 256.0 317.0 243.0 280.0 266.0 287.0 247.0 382.0
Median 536.0 430.0 535.0 348.0 561.0 460.0 456.0 533.0 544.0 377.0 543.0 610.0 524.0 601.0 548.0
Mean 550.0 436.0 515.2 353.5 500.9 360.3 502.9 509.1 523.2 428.0 464.9 506.6 530.8 524.8 497.7
3rd Qu. 780.0 699.0 790.0 455.0 696.0 532.0 846.0 751.0 729.0 675.0 679.0 802.0 713.0 844.0 616.0
Max. 959.0 871.0 950.0 945.0 937.0 869.0 953.0 961.0 896.0 931.0 955.0 944.0 955.0 934.0 868.0
Actual 2005:2 2006:1 2006:2 2007:1 2007:2 2008:1 2008:2 2009:1 2009:2 2010:1 2010:2 2011:1
Min. 28.00 36.00 12.00 6.000 24.00 1.000 13.00 43.00 83.00 64.00 1.000 7.000
1st Qu. 198.0 222.0 175.0 305.0 345.0 228.0 85.00 462.0 185.0 385.0 142.0 126.0
Median 453.0 371.0 390.0 517.0 504.0 415.0 252.0 633.0 412.0 660.0 254.0 308.0
Mean 463.4 470.6 392.3 513.8 563.2 464.7 345.2 607.2 498.2 545.9 413.6 431.3
3rd Qu. 775.0 762.0 588.0 683.0 821.0 795.0 553.0 849.0 902.0 707.0 678.0 712.0
Max. 920.0 949.0 946.0 957.0 941.0 914.0 900.0 952.0 951.0 927.0 948.0 958.0
Prediction 2011:2 2012:1 2012:2 2013:1 2013:2 2014:1 2014:2 2015:1 2015:2 2016:1 2016:2 2017:1
Min. 30.00 64.00 30.00 1.000 4.000 102.0 17.00 1.000 33.00 70.00 16.00 5.000
1st Qu. 298.0 214.0 234.0 279.0 167.0 475.0 211.0 337.0 106.0 268.0 290.0 205.0
Median 404.0 466.0 442.0 478.0 411.0 566.0 440.0 489.0 301.0 506.0 406.0 389.0
Mean 475.7 485.3 480.1 494.4 439.6 573.4 457.9 524.4 362.4 507.4 491.1 445.2
3rd Qu. 736.0 698.0 673.0 720.0 786.0 758.0 741.0 726.0 604.0 725.0 788.0 741.0
Max. 956.0 960.0 912.0 925.0 921.0 937.0 954.0 957.0 951.0 908.0 951.0 910.0
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